Tentative Taba Agreement
January 2001
1.TERRITORY
The two sides agreed that
in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolution 242, the
June 4, 1967 lines would be the basis for the borders between
Israel and the State of Palestine. Any modifications will be
calculated from this baseline.
1.1. The West Bank
For the first time both sides presented their own maps of the
West Bank. The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory
and settlements
The Clinton parameters served as a loose
base for the discussion, but differences of interpretations regarding
the scope and meaning of the parameters emerged. The Palestinian
side stated that it had accepted the Clinton proposal, but with
reservations.
The Israeli side stated
that the Clinton proposals provided for annexation of settlement
blocs. The Palestinian side did not agree that the parameters
included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex blocs.
The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant
harm to Palestinian needs and rights, particularly for the Palestinians
residing in areas Israel seeks to annex
The Palestinian
side maintained that since Israel has needs in Palestinian territory,
it is responsible for proposing the necessary border modifications.
The Palestinian side reiterated that such proposals must not
adversely affect the Palestinians' needs and rights.
The Israeli side stated
that it did not need to maintain settlements in the Jordan Valley
for security purposes, and its proposed maps reflected this position.
The Israeli maps were principally
based on a demographic concept of settlement blocs incorporating
80% of the settlers. The Israeli side sketched a map presenting
a 6% annexation of the West Bank, the outer limit of the Clinton
proposal. The Palestinian illustrative map presented 3.1% of
the West Bank in the context of a land swap.
Both sides accepted the principle of land swap but the proportionality
of the swap remained under discussion
The Israeli side requested an additional 2% of land under a lease
agreement to which the Palestinians responded that the subject
of lease could only be discussed after the establishment of a
Palestinian state and the transfer of land to Palestinian sovereignty.
1.2. Gaza Strip
It was implied that the Gaza Strip would be under total
Palestinian sovereignty
all settlements will be evacuated.
The Palestinians claimed it could be arranged in 6 months, a
timetable not agreed by the Israeli side
2.JERUSALEM
2.1. Sovereignty
Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having
Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and Israeli sovereignty
over Jewish neighborhoods. The Palestinian side, within the context
of a land swap, affirmed that it was ready to discuss Israeli
requests regarding settlements in East Jerusalem that were constructed
after 1967, but not Jebel Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud. The Palestinian
side rejected Israeli sovereignty over settlements outside the
municipal borders of Jerusalem, such as Ma'ale Adumim and Givat
Ze'ev.
The Palestinian side understood that Israel was ready to accept
Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem,
including the entire Muslim, Christian and Armenian quarters
of the old city of Jerusalem, The Israeli side understood that
the Palestinians were willing to accept Israeli sovereignty over
the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and part of the Armenian quarter.
2.2. Open City
Both sides favored the idea of an Open City
2.3. Capital for Two
States
Both sides accepted that the City of Jerusalem would be the capital
of the two states: Yerushalayim, capital of Israel and Al-Qods,
capital of the State of Palestine.
2.4. Holy/Historical
Basin and the Old City
The Israeli side expressed its interest and raised its
concern regarding the area conceptualized as the Holy Basin (which
includes the Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the City
of David, Kidron Valley). The Palestinian side confirmed that
it was willing to take into account Israeli interests and concerns
provided that these places remain under Palestinian sovereignty.
Another option for the Holy Basin, suggested informally by the
Israeli side, was to create a special regime or to suggest some
form of internationalization for the entire area or a joint regime
with special cooperation and coordination. The Palestinian side
did not agree to adopt any of these ideas, although the discussion
could continue.
2.5. Holy Sites/Western
Wall and the Wailing Wall
Both parties have accepted the principle of respective control
over each side's respective holy sites by the two parties (religious
control and management). According to this principle, Israeli
control over the Western Wall would be recognized although there
remained a dispute regarding the area covered by the Wall and
especially the link to what is referred to in Clinton's ideas
as "the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part."
The Palestinian side acknowledged
that Israel has requested to establish an affiliation to the
holy parts of the Western Wall, but given its own reservations
regarding the delineation of the Western/Wailing Wall, this issue
has not been fully resolved.
2.6. Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount
Both sides agreed that the question of Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount has not been resolved
An informal suggestion was raised
that for an agreed period such as three years, Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount would be under international sovereignty of the P5 [the
five permanent members of the Security Council] plus Morocco
(or another Islamic presence), whereby the Palestinians would
be the "Guardian/Custodians" during this period. At
the end of this period, either the parties would agree on a new
solution or agree to extend the existing arrangement. In the
absence of an agreement, the parties would return to implement
the Clinton formulation. Neither accepted or rejected the suggestion.
3. REFUGEES
Non-papers were exchanged, which were regarded as a good basis
for talks
Both sides suggested, as
a basis, that the parties should agree that a just settlement
of the refugee problem in accordance with the UN Security Council
Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of the UN General
Assembly Resolution 194. Both sides maintained their respective
narratives regarding the essence of UNGAR 194, namely the right
of return versus the wish to return.
3.1. Narrative
The Israeli side put forward a suggested joint narrative for
the tragedy of the Palestinian refuges. The Palestinian side
discussed the proposed narrative and there was much progress,
although no agreement concluded.
3.2. Return, Repatriation,
and Relocation and Rehabilitation
Both sides engaged in a discussion of the practicalities of resolving
the refugee problem. The Palestinian side reiterated that the
Palestinian refugees shall have the right of return to their
homes in accordance with UNGAR 194. The Israeli side expressed
its understanding that the wish to return as per wording of UNGAR
194 shall be implemented within the framework of one of the following
programs:
A. Return and Repatriation
- To Israel
- To Israel swapped territories
[Israeli territory transferred to the Palestinians in a land-swap
agreement], which will be over and above territories discussed
in the territorial negotiations
- To the Palestinian state
B. Rehabilitation and Relocation
- Rehabilitation in a host
country
- Relocation to a 3rd country
Preference in all of these
options shall be accorded to the Palestinian refugee population
in Lebanon.
The Palestinian side stressed that the above shall be subject
to the individual free choice of the refugees
The Israeli side, informally,
suggested a three-track 15-year absorption program. The first
track referred to the absorption to Israel. No numbers were agreed
upon, but with a non-paper referring to 25,000 in the first 3
years of the program (40,o00 in the first 5 years this program
did not appear in the non-paper but was raised verbally). The
second track referred to the absorption of Palestinian refugees
into the Israeli territory that shall be transferred to Palestinian
sovereignty, and the third track referring to the absorption
of refugees in the context of the family reunification theme.
4. SECURITY
4.1. Early Warning Signs
The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning stations on
Palestinian territory. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept
the continued operations of the early warning stations but subject
to certain conditioned. The exact mechanism has therefore to
be detailed in further negotiations.
4.2. Military Capacity
of the State of Palestine
The Israeli side maintained that the State of Palestine will
be non-militarized as per the Clinton proposals, The Palestinian
side was prepared to accept
[that Palestine] be defined
as a state with limited arms
both sides agree that this
issue has not been concluded
4.4. Timetable for Withdrawal
from the West Bank and Jordan Valley
Based on the Clinton proposal, the Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal
from the West Bank over a 36-month period with an additional
36 months for the Jordan Valley in conjunction with an international
force.
The Palestinian side rejected
the 36-month withdrawal process expressing concern that a lengthy
process would exacerbate Israeli-Palestinian tensions. The Palestinian
side proposed an 18-month withdrawal under the supervision of
international forces. As to the Jordan Valley the Palestinian
side was prepared to consider the withdrawal of Israeli armed
forces for an additional 10-month period. Although the Palestinian
side was ready to consider the presence of international forces
in the West Bank for a longer period, it refused to accept the
ongoing presence of Israeli forces