Peace is possible

November, 2002

"The Martin Buber Group ‑ Jews for Peace" believes Diaspora Jews have a duty to strongly support the forces of peace in the Middle East and to facilitate dialogue and understanding between the Israeli and Palestinian societies. The very nature of the conflict, between two peoples that have to coexist on the same land implies that the principal actors of a just solution must be in the first place the protagonists of the conflict itself, namely the Israelis and the Palestinians. No other solution imposed from the outside will result in a full and lasting peace. But at the same time, no solution will be reached without a balanced effort at mediation and the determined support of the international community. To this end a greater commitment by the European Union is essential.

Israel's condition

The present crisis, born with the outbreak of the second intifada and the hideous slaughters of Israeli civilians, has endangered the future of the State of Israel itself, nurturing among its citizens an anguished feeling of physical and psychological insecurity. This state of mind, not clearly understood by European public opinion and political leaders, has been acutely perceived by the Jewish world, both in Israel and in the Diaspora, renewing once again the feeling of Jewish isolation and loneliness. Considering the situation arising from the strategy of suicide terrorism and the fundamentalist degeneration in part of Palestinian society, we must reaffirm the right to exist in peace and security of the State of Israel, whose birth was a historical milestone for the Jewish people and for the whole of humankind.

Territories in return for peace

The "Arab refusal" to recognize Israel and to work for peace has provoked many years of suffering and griefs of which the primary victims have been the Palestinian people An end to the "Arab refusal" and the acceptance of Israel as a legitimate state fully integrated in the Middle East does not depend, however, exclusively on the Arab world, but also requires on the Israeli side a coherent political vision and action towards dialogue and integration in the region. Israel maintained its occupation of Arab lands after the 1967 war on the grounds that they constituted a decisive bargaining chip in future negotiations in return for the acceptance of Israel on the basis of the doctrine of "land for peace". This indeed occurred when the Sinai was returned following the peace treaty with Egypt, but it is not yet the case with the Golan, the West Bank and Gaza.

This is precisely the reason why we cannot envisage an Israeli unilateral withdrawal without a prior peace agreement. Instead of facilitating an agreement, this would imply by itself giving up the quest for a permanent solution, thus heightening the risk of a new war.

The settlements

Since the Eighties', the senseless policy of settlements and confiscation of lands in the West Bank and in Gaza has changed the nature of the Israeli occupation, transforming it into a permanent, creeping annexation. The need to protect the settlements and its inhabitants has determined a system of severe and humiliating restrictions on the Palestinians' freedom, life and working conditions.

This has reinforced, among Palestinians, the conviction that even the limited Autonomy after Oslo amounted to relegating the future Palestinian State to a mere set of fragmented enclaves surrounded by the Israeli army and settlements. Settlements have had, therefore, a double negative consequence: undermining the credibility of the "land for peace" formula and, at the same time, dragging the Israeli people into a practice of dominating another people. Therefore a unilateral policy of dismantling the settlements starting from those in the Gaza strip would have a double value: setting in motion a solution to the problem by removing points of daily friction with the Palestinian residents and signaling Israeli flexibility towards a peaceful solution of the conflict.

Palestinian policy

The present tragic situation, with its unbearable human costs, originated mainly from the failures at Camp David, although the gap between the positions was almost filled up by the subsequent proposals known as the "Clinton parameters" and discussed during the Taba negotiations.

All the Israeli governments that followed Rabin's assassination were incapable and unwilling to understand how deep was Palestinian society's disenchantment and despair. However, the responsibility for the "second Intifada" lies primarily on the Palestinian leadership, convinced it could obtain better terms than those rejected at Camp David by resorting to violence. This choice was made even more devastating by the continuing ambiguity in its relations with fundamentalist extremism.

Whereas the 1988-93 first Intifada was a popular spontaneous revolt that gave birth to a new leadership and the acceptance of the doctrine "two peoples-two States", the "al‑Aqsa Intifada" with its strong Islamic features was organized and led by various Palestinian factions, and soon took the form of an armed conflict which degenerated very quickly into terroristic violence.

Israeli policy

Terrorism, particularly suicide terrorism, cannot be eliminated simply through the use of repressive military force. Experience has shown that Israeli military retaliation produces innocent victims and generates even more violence in spiralling reciprocal brutality.

Terrorism can only be eradicated from within, by Palestinian society itself. To this end, Israel must adopt a policy that tends to separate Palestinian society from the terrorist leaders and to offer a credible prospect of peaceful coexistence. In particular, to give young people the hope of a normal future with the "peace dividends" that were beginning to take shape in the mid-'90s.

The Israeli government of Prime Minister Sharon has shown that it is unable to offer a political solution alongside military repression. It seems to be guided by the desire to destroy the PNA and the entire Palestinian national movement, in the illusion that defeated Palestinians will, in the end, accept a permanent submission to Israel.

This line of action can only make a peaceful solution of the conflict impossible. It also increases Israel's international isolation and endangers its future as a democratic State founded on the values of Judaism.

The only path: negotiation

The essential condition to ensure survival and dignity for both peoples is the end of the logic of terrorism and war, a return to the negotiating table without pre-conditions. For this to be possible, there must be a renewed commitment from the international community and, above all, a change in the policy of the leaderships of the two peoples. In particular, we believe that the content of the Taba negotiations are the basic and realistic framework for a final agreement that foresees:

• the establishment of a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza, within the pre-1967 borders (except for limited territorial adjustments agreed on by both sides);
• the evacuation of Jewish settlements (except those agreed on by both sides);
• Jerusalem as capital of two States, with the practical arrangements already configured in the negotiations so as to maintain unity of the city;
• a just solution for Palestinian refugees, combining their return to the new Palestinian State with adequate financial compensation from the international community;
• in this framework it will be possible to also tackle the issue of compensation for Jewish refugees from Arab countries. The funds collected in this way could also be used to finance projects of development cooperation in the region.

Beyond the details of a diplomatic solution, we deeply believe that Israelis and Palestinians will only be able to ensure for themselves a future together if they reject the use of force and establish a relationship based on mutual respect and equal dignity.

Martin Buber Group - Jews for Peace

Rome, Italy
November 2002