The War over the Settlements

As Amos Oz, one of Israel’s best known writers, claims, the war under way actually conceals two wars being fought simultaneously: one, the “unjust” war, is the one triggered by fundamentalist Islamism against Israel and the Jews with the intent of setting up an Islamic state in an “Arab Palestine”; the other, the “just” one is that of the Palestinian people aspiring to an independent state worthy of the name. Conversely, Israel is also fighting two wars: a just one to defend its right to exist as a people and a state, accepted in its integrity and security in the Middle East; and another unjust and futile one, to perpetuate its occupation of the territories and the Jewish settlements located there.

Let’s consider the figures: there are about 220,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza, that is excluding those living in the neighbourhoods of Jerusalem that extend beyond the “Green line” (Gilo, Ramot, Pisgat Zeev, approximately 190,000 persons). Even in full Intifada, only in few of the 144 settlements did the number of settlers decrease. There are over 7000 settlers in the Gaza Strip alone, in 16 communities occupying 20 percent of that impoverished land already oppressed by one of the highest population densities in the world.

Israeli state support for the expansion of the settlements is substantial and considerably more generous than to other beneficiaries. In the last ten years, the settlements have received transfers from the state equal to approximately 920 euros per year per capita, while the development towns have received 575 euros and Arab communities in Israel 430 euros. As concerns housing, state funds finance 50 percent in the settlements as opposed to 25 percent in Israel. Sixty percent more homes are built with public funds in the territories than behind the Green line[1] – and this has continued even after the Oslo agreements sanctioned an end to all construction of settlements in the occupied territories. Not to mention the “bypass roads” built to allow the settlers to move around in the territories and to reach Israel, and the subsidies for buying a home in the territories.

What is the objective of this policy of expansion in the territories? Why have settlements been established even in the areas most densely populated by Palestinians? Those territories which, after the 1967 war, were to be used as bargaining chips in exchange for recognition of Israel and peace have become places of permanent occupation to prevent the formation of a Palestinian state with the sovereignty and territorial continuity necessary for a small but autonomous state. In reality, the territories have become an extension of Israeli sovereignty; the army is there to protect the settlers and to assert Israel’s de facto sovereignty over them.

The occupation has produced its malignant effects: restrictions on the freedom of movement, daily harassment and humiliation, road blocks. The occupied territories have become an obstacle to peace and, paradoxically, a threat to the very security of Israel, its citizens and its soldiers.

If the people of Israel realise that they cannot dominate another people and that they want to live in a democratic state, in which the Jews are the majority and the masters of their fate – in keeping with the ideals inspiring Zionism – then they must “free” themselves of the territories and aim at the coexistence of two states with recognised borders and good neighbourly relations.

What to do? Given the numbers, the magnitude and the power of vested interests, a forced evacuation of the settlers is unthinkable. But any agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, will call for a first phase of evacuation of the at least 50,000-60,000 people living in the more distant and scattered settlements. Then, combining some of the large settlements close to the Green line into contiguous blocks, as Barak proposed and negotiated at Taba (with an equal exchange of land of the state of Israel handed over to the future state of Palestine), and annexing them to Israel along with the sprawling suburbs of Jerusalem, could provide a solution for another approximately 150,000 settlers. It is unlikely that the Palestinians would accept such a solution Therefore, some kind of system of incentives must be devised to encourage a large portion of settlers to repatriate and to allow for the continued presence of the others in the territories in respect of Palestinian sovereignty.

For those settlers who moved to the territories for pragmatic-material reasons (subsidised housing, the quality of suburban life, tax incentives), repatriation would be easier, because they are basically commuters, with a lifestyle that is not much different than if they were living in Israel. And today, with the terrorist attacks along the roads and the insecurity, and tomorrow, with the establishment of a Palestinian state, they will probably want to return within Israel’s borders. Perhaps, in a future of peaceful coexistence and open borders, there could even be Jewish communities with autonomous administrations in the territories, in the same way as there are Arab communities in Israel now: the Jews that stay on would be foreign residents in the Palestinian state and subject to its laws.

But the settlers driven by a nationalist-religious ideology, convinced that they are fulfilling the religious dictate of repossessing the sacred land and places and devoted to the myth of a “Great Israel” will oppose evacuation. But they will have to submit to the democratic decisions of their government.

How much could such a repatriation cost? Let’s make a rough estimate. Supposing that between 60 and 70 percent were willing to return to Israel: 130,000-150,000 people or approximately 25,000-30,000 families. On the basis of the average cost of a home in Israel (approximately 280,000 euros per family), one could estimate a total cost of 7-9 billion euros. Within the framework of an overall settlement of the conflict, a number of countries could contribute to this sum: the United States and the European Union countries, as well as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. Purchasing the homes of the settlers, they could then hand them over to Palestinian refugees settling in the future state of Palestine.

1. Adva Center, “Government allocations to Israeli settlements in the territories in the 1990s”, quoted in N. Strasler, “Every settler a king”, Ha’aretz, 1 February 2002.